

# THE IMPACT OF EXPECTATIONS ON GIVING BEHAVIOR

Evidence from a Dictator Game Experiment

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## **Abstract**

This paper investigates to what extent expectations stated by the receiver can contribute to the explanation of generous giving behavior in a dictator game. Therefore, different variants of a two-round dictator game have been conducted. The experimental results yield that dictators adapt the amount they share to the receivers' expectations if they are sufficiently sensitive towards other people's expectations. In order to minimize the discrepancy between the amount they shared in round 1 and the receivers' expectations, dictators both raise and lower the amount they share in round 2. The experiment thus supports the idea that giving is in part due to the desire to meet other people's actual expectations. Possible limitations of the results will be discussed.

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## 1 INTRODUCTION

A widely used game to investigate social preferences in laboratory experiments is the dictator game in which a first player – the dictator – is given an endowment of money and then asked to state how much out of this amount of money he wants to give to a passive, anonymous receiver. A robust result is that dictators share about 20% of the amount being divided (cf. Camerer 2003: 56). The experimental evidence thus clearly deviates from what standard game theory would predict: A rational, self-interested dictator would keep the whole endowment to maximize his utility. The observed generosity has been commonly interpreted in the way that dictators have a taste of fairness or are inequality averse meaning that they obtain higher utility from those fair outcomes than from simply maximizing their own monetary payoffs. The underlying social preferences approaches are based on the assumption that a dictator's preferences can be entirely described by only considering the final payoff distribution (cf. Dana, Weber and Xi Kuang 2007: 68).

In recent experiments – however – it could be shown that generosity in dictator games decreases significantly once dictators are given the possibility to behave selfishly without appearing unfair. Dana et al. (2007) show that reducing transparency between the dictator's action and the consequences to the receiver leads to more selfish behavior indicating that it is not solely the fair outcome per se convincing the dictator to make a fair allocation decision. Instead, *appearing* fair seems to predominate *being* fair. Similar results come from Dana, Cain and Dawes (2006) who show that giving is in part due to the dictator's desire to meet the receiver's expectations.

This paper ties in with the upcoming experimental results attenuating the magnitude of social preferences. It presents an experiment that has been conducted in the context of the Experimental Economics Seminar at the University of Passau. The experiment investigates to what extent expectations stated by the receivers can contribute to the explanation of generous giving behavior in a dictator game.

## 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

The foundation for the thereafter presented experiment builds the already mentioned work by Dana et al. (2006) who conducted a dictator game experiment yielding the following results: While many dictators prefer a \$9 exit option rather than playing a \$10 dictator game in the baseline treatment in which the receiver is informed that a dictator game is played, nearly no dictator exits in the private condition in which the receiver is not informed at all regardless of what the dictator opts for. While dictators are willing to pay \$1 for the exit option in the first treatment in order not to be confronted with the receiver's expectations, they do not feel uncomfortable in playing a dictator game and implementing eventually unfair outcomes as long as the receiver remains uninformed in the private condition treatment. To take into account the role of the receiver's expectations in the dictator's giving behavior, Dana et al. (2006: 200) propose the following utility function for the dictator:

$$U \equiv X - m - \alpha |\mu - m|$$

The dictator's utility is thus determined by his own payoff (defined by the difference between the initial endowment  $X$  and the amount given to the receiver  $m$ ) reduced by the absolute value resulting from a comparison between the amount shared  $m$  and the amount the dictator thinks the receiver expects him to give  $\mu$ . The parameter  $\alpha$  by which the absolute value is multiplied takes into account that people differ with regard to their sensitivity to other people's expectations and is therefore assumed to be heterogeneous among different individuals.

It is important to state that the variable  $\mu$  indicates what the dictator *believes* the receiver expects to get and is thus not necessarily equal to what the receiver *actually* expects to get. Further, using the absolute value implies that the dictator's utility is not only lowered in case of giving less than the expected amount, but also in the situation in which the dictator gives more than the receiver wishes to get. Deviations from the expected amount therefore matter in both ways.

Broberg, Ellingsen and Johannesson (2007) go one step further and replicate the study of Dana et al. with one modification: They do not offer a fixed exit price to the dictators, but estimate the exit reservation values. They find that the mean exit reservation price equals 82% of the dictator game endowment meaning that dictators are even willing to bear higher costs in order to avoid the dictator game. Broberg et al. conclude that models based on social preferences perform even worse than suggested by the study of Dana et al.

### 3 RESEARCH QUESTION

In the experiment conducted by Dana et al. (2006), the dictator is given the opportunity to avoid the receiver's expectations by exiting from the dictator game, even if this exit involves costs. Further, it only considers the dictator's *beliefs* about the receiver's expectations, but not the actually stated expectations.

Therefore, the following questions emerge: What happens if the dictator does not have this exit option and is thus necessarily confronted with the receiver's expectations? Does the dictator incorporate the actual receiver's expectations if the corresponding information is made available? And beyond that: Is the dictator even willing to buy the information in order to meet the receiver's expectations in his allocation decision? These questions form the motivation of this paper and are the foundation for the experiment presented hereafter.

### 4 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

The basic game of the experiment is a two-round dictator game. At the beginning of the experiment, the participants do not know how many rounds the game comprises. The reason for why this information is not provided to the participants at the beginning of the experiment will be explained later. In each round, the dictator receives an initial endowment of 100€ he is asked to divide between the receiver and himself. The payoffs of both rounds are added at the end of the game. The experiment consists of three different treatments, called T0, T1 and T2 in the following.

The first round of all three treatments is identical: The dictator receives 100€ and is asked to state the amount he wants to give to the receiver (amount shared round 1). In the mean-

time, the receiver is asked which amount shared by the dictator he considers as acceptable (receiver's expectations). Following the classification of different types of expectations employed by Bicchieri and Xiao (2009), the receiver is asked to state his *normative* expectations.<sup>1</sup> Normative expectations can be inquired by asking the receiver *What amount should the dictator give to you?* or *What amount do you consider as acceptable?* After the dictator indicated the amount he wants to share with the receiver, he is asked to state what he thinks the receiver answered when he was asked about his normative expectations (dictator's expectations). Finally, both players are informed about the payoff they earned in the first round. The second round of each treatment differs.

In T0 – the baseline treatment – the same game played in round 1 is only repeated while this time, no expectations are requested: The dictator receives 100€, is asked to state how much he wants to share (amount shared round 2) and both players are informed about the payoff of the second round and about the overall payoff.

In T1 – the free information treatment – the dictator is shown the information about the receiver's expectations the latter stated during the first round. So before the dictator is asked to indicate how much he wants to share, the figure showing the amount the receiver considers as acceptable is shown to him. The receiver comes to know that his answer is shown to the dictator. The fact that the receiver's answer is shown to the dictator without having told the receiver beforehand cannot be considered as deception. Following Hey (1998: 397), "there is a world between not telling subjects things and telling them the wrong this. *The latter is deception, the former not.*" The same holds true for this experiment: The receiver was not given wrong information, but certain information was only made available later. This proceeding was required because telling the receiver that his answer will be made available to the dictator in a second round would have led to distorted answers. This is also the explanation for why the subjects were not told that a second round will be played. Only thereby it could be possible to reveal the true expectations a receiver has towards the dictator. Finally, after the dictator stated the amount he wants to share, both players are informed about the payoff of the second round and about their overall payoff.

In T2 – the costly information treatment – the dictator is offered to buy the information about the receiver's expectations for 5€ at the beginning of round 2. If he decides to buy the information, the receiver's statement made in round 1 is made available before he has to indicate the amount he wants to share. His payoff is then reduced by 5€. If the dictator decides not to buy the information, then he simply indicates the amount he wants to give to the receiver. In both cases, the receiver learns that the dictator had the possibility to buy the information and how he actually decided. Finally, both players are informed about the payoff in round 2 and the overall payoff.

## 5 HYPOTHESES

Based on the experimental design, the following hypotheses shall be tested:

**Hypothesis 1:** A dictator cares about what a receiver expects him to give. Whereas a dictator in T0 only states what he *believes* the receiver is expecting, which corresponds to the variable  $\mu$  in the utility function (dictator's expectations), a dictator in T1 receives

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<sup>1</sup> Bicchieri and Xiao (2009: 192) define a normative expectation as "belief that others expect one to conform to a given norm".

information about the *actual* expectations (receiver's expectations). While a dictator in T0 can have simply false beliefs about the receiver's expectations, a dictator in T1 is necessarily confronted with the receiver's real expectations. Therefore, at least some dictators in T1 adapt their amount they share in round 2 to the amount the receiver considered being acceptable. The result is that the absolute value of the difference between the receivers' expectations and the amount shared in round 2 is smaller in T1 compared to T0.

**Hypothesis 2:** Expectations matter in both directions meaning that dictators in T1 as well as dictators in T2 who buy the information are not only increasing the amount they want to share, but also lower the amount if this is in line with the receiver's expectations. The result is that the difference between the amount shared in round 1 and the amount shared in round 2 can yield a positive or negative figure.

**Hypothesis 3:** People are different with regard to their sensitivity towards other people's expectations. Therefore, fewer dictators in T2 compared to T1 make use of the information about the receiver's real expectations and adapt the amount they share to the amount being considered acceptable by the receivers once this information becomes costly. The result is that only those dictators in T2 who buy the information may adapt the amount shared in round 2 to the receiver's expectations compared to dictators in T2 who did not.

**Hypothesis 4:** Individuals with a high sensitivity towards other people's expectations suffer a big utility loss when the amount they share and the amount the receiver considers being acceptable diverge strongly. Since only dictators with a high sensitivity are likely to buy the information, those are adapting the amount shared more closely to the receiver's expectations compared to dictators in T1 in which every dictator gets the information regardless of his  $\alpha$ . The result is that the absolute value of the difference between the receivers' expectations and the amount shared in round 2 will be smaller in T2 compared to T1 because of the high  $\alpha$  dictators in T2 who buy the information have.


## 6 PROCEDURES

The experiment has been programmed with *z-Tree* (cf. Fischbacher 2007) and was carried out in a computer pool at the University of Passau in December 2012. Overall, the experiment comprised 10 sessions that took place on two different days. Participants have been recruited on a voluntary basis and were mostly students. Since the participants could not be paid in terms of money, cookies and candies were provided as compensation for their willingness to participate. The experiment has been conducted in combination with an experiment of a fellow student. In order to take into account order effects, the order in which both experiments have been carried out has been changed in each session. Overall, 130 participants took part in the two experiments. At the beginning of each session, a common welcoming text has been read out. Depending on the number of participants, each session lasted between 20 and 35 minutes. At the end of each session, participants had the possibility to sign up in a list if they were interested in obtaining the experimental results.

## 7 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Before the hypotheses are tested in detail, some general patterns and results will be presented: Overall, 130 individuals participated in the experiment, of which 51 have been male (39,2%) and 79 female (60,8%). The participants were between 18 and 42 years old with an average age of 22 years. The degree programs in which most of the participants were enrolled are Business Administration and Economics (33,8%), Teaching (16,2%) and International Cultural and Business Studies (13,8%). In terms of the distribution of the participants among the different treatments, 38 individuals were assigned to T0 (29,2%), 44 participants to T1 (33,8%) and 48 to T2 (36,9%).

A look at the mean amounts shared in round 1 and round 2 across the three treatments yields the following results:



**Figure 1:** Mean amounts shared in round 1 and round 2 across treatments


As the figure illustrates, the mean amount a dictator shared in round 1 is in each treatment lower than the mean amount the dictator shared in round 2. This difference is statistically significant at the 1% level for T0, but not statistically significant for T1 and T2.<sup>2</sup> The mean amount shared in round 1 across all treatments is 31,20€; the overall mean amount shared in round 2 32,91€. Those two figures are significantly different from each other at the 5% level.<sup>3</sup> Comparing the mean amounts shared in round 1 across all three treatments shows that the amounts do not differ significantly from each other. The same pattern holds true for a comparison of the mean amounts shared in round 2 across all treatments.<sup>4</sup> Besides considering the mean amounts that have been shared by dictators, it is interesting to see how those amounts have been distributed, which is illustrated by the following figure:

<sup>2</sup> Based on a Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test yielding the following asymptotic significance levels: 0,009 (T0), 0,764 (T1), 0,142 (T2).

<sup>3</sup> Equally based on a Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test yielding an asymptotic significance level of 0,038.

<sup>4</sup> Based on a Kruskal Wallis Test yielding the following asymptotic significance levels: 0,667 (amount shared round 1) and 0,839 (amount shared round 2).






**Figure 2:** Distribution of the amounts shared in round 1 and round 2

As one can see from the bar diagrams, there are some amounts that have been chosen relatively often compared to other amounts. Three main outliers can be identified in each graph: In the first round, amounts of 0€, 20€ and 50€ have been shared relatively frequently, while in round 2 amounts of 0€, 40€ and 50€ have been chosen in many cases. Sharing nothing is in line with the result standard game theory would predict. The peak at giving 20€ to the receiver corresponds to the result that has been found in many studies conducting dictator games (cf. Camerer 2003: 56). And giving half of the initial endowment is finally an indicator for inequality aversion.

Apart from analyzing the amounts that have been shared, it is worth to have a look at the expectations both the dictators and the receivers stated. The following figure shows the mean expectations illustrated for each treatment:




**Figure 3:** Dictators' and receivers' mean expectations across treatments

In each treatment the mean expectations the dictators stated are lower than the amount the receivers indicated to expect. The difference is in all treatments statistically significant, at

the 5% level for T0 and at the 1% level for T1 and T2.<sup>5</sup> The same pattern holds true when the overall mean amount for the receivers' expectations (34,66€) is compared with the overall mean amount for the dictators' expectations (19,58€): The figures differ significantly on a 1% level.<sup>6</sup> Comparing the dictators' expectations as well as the receivers' expectations across treatments yields no significant differences.<sup>7</sup>

In terms of the stated expectations it is also interesting to consider how the stated amounts have been distributed, illustrated by the following bar diagrams:



**Figure 4:** Distribution of the receivers' and dictators' expectations

Both diagrams have some noticeable peaks: While many receivers indicate that they consider amounts of 30€ (13,8%), 40€ (24,6%) and 50€ (23,1%) as acceptable, 65 dictators (50%) state that they think that the receiver expects to get 0€. At least 26 (20%) of the dictators indicate to believe that receivers expect to get an amount of 50€.

After having analyzed some general patterns and results of the experiment, each hypothesis is now considered in detail:


### Hypothesis 1

To test whether dictators in T1 adapt the amount shared in round 2 closer to the receivers' expectations than do dictators in T0, a new variable is computed: The absolute value of the difference between the receivers' expectations and the amount shared in round 2. Comparing this variable across T0 and T1 yields the following result: The mean value for this variable is 18,90€ for T0 and 14,50€ for T1. This means that dictators in T0 adapted the amount shared in round 2 less to the receivers' expectations than did dictators in T1 since the amount shared in round 2 and the value for the receivers' expectations differ more in absolute terms in T0 compared to T1. In other words, dictators in T1 seem to have adapted their amount shared in round 2 closer to the amount receivers expected than dictators in T0. The following figure, which plots the receivers' expectations and the amount shared in round 2 for T0 and T1, supports this guess:

<sup>5</sup> A Wilcoxon Ranks Test has been conducted and yielded the following asymptotic significance levels: 0,045 (T0), 0,000 (T1) and 0,000 (T2).

<sup>6</sup> A Wilcoxon Ranks Rest yielded an asymptotic significance level of 0,000.

<sup>7</sup> A Kruskal Wallis Test yielded asymptotic significance levels of 0,562 (dictators' expectations) and 0,198 (receivers' expectations).




**Figure 5:** Comparison of the amounts shared in round 2 and the receivers' expectations

As the figure indicates, the dots in the diagram belonging to T1 are more concentrated around the 45°-line than in the diagram corresponding to T0. The 45°-line indicates that the amount shared in round 2 and the receivers' expectations are identical. The farther away the dots, the larger is the value for the above introduced variable. So far, one would suggest that H1 can be confirmed. However, a Mann-Whitney U Test yields that the difference between 18,90€ for T0 and 14,50€ for T1 is not statistically significant: The analysis yields an asymptotic significance level of 0,145 so that statistical significance is not even given at a 10% level. Concluding one can say that the observed difference seems to be in line with the formulated hypothesis, but since the difference is not significant, the hypothesis has to be rejected.

### Hypothesis 2

To test whether dictators who are given the information about the receivers' expectations adapt the amount shared in round 2 in both directions, the differences between the amount shared in round 1 and the amount shared in round 2 are illustrated:



**Figure 6:** Differences between the amount shared in round 1 and the amount shared in round 2

As one can see in the graph, building the difference between the amount shared in round 1 and the amount shared in round 2 yields positive as well as negative numbers only for T1 and T2, but not for T0 (with one single exception). This means that dictators in T1 as well as dictators in T2 who bought the information raised as well as lowered the amount given in

round 2. This indicates that deviations from the receivers' expectations matter in two ways and in terms of the utility function, a dictator tries to minimize the absolute value of the difference. H2 can therefore be supported.

### **Hypothesis 3**

To test whether only those dictators in T2 who buy the information adapt their amount shared in round 2 to the receivers' expectations, the variable that has already been computed for H1, that is the absolute value of the difference between the receivers' expectations and the amount shared in round 2, is compared between dictators who bought the information in T2 and those who did not. The mean absolute value for dictators who did not buy the information is 23,50€ whereas the value is 12,10€ for the other group of dictators. This means that the average amount shared in round 2 is much closer to the receivers' expectations for those dictators who actually had the information about what receivers consider being acceptable. Further, the difference between 23,50€ and 12,10€ is statistically significant at the 5% level (asymptotic significance level of 0,021). The result is thus in line with H3 so that H3 can be confirmed.

### **Hypothesis 4**

Following H4, dictators in T2 who bought the information adapt the amount they share in round 2 on average closer to the receivers' expectations than do dictators in T1, since dictators who are willing to spend money in order to get to know the receivers' expectations are likely to be very sensitive to meet the receivers' expectations. So once dictators in T2 bought the information, they are also likely to be adapting the amount they give in a large extent to what the receivers expect. The mean absolute value of the difference between the receivers' expectations and the amount shared in round 2 for T1 is 14,50€ (see H1) and 12,10€ for T2. It seems that dictators in T2 actually minimized the difference more strongly than did dictators in T1. A Mann Whitney U Test yields that the difference between 14,50€ and 12,10€ is statistically significant at the 10%-level (asymptotic significance level: 0,084). So concluding one can say that evidence for H4 exists to some extent, even if the significance level is not really high.

## **8 LIMITATIONS**

As far as the predictive power of the above presented results is concerned, the following limitations have to be made. First of all the general procedures can be criticized: The experiment has been conducted in a provisional computer lab that did not fulfill the standards of a computer lab for experiments. Real anonymity between the participants was not given. A further weakness is that payoffs could not be paid out so that a monetary incentive was lacking. It is thus likely that participants showed more generosity than they would in case of playing for real money. The subject pool consisted of voluntary students from few degree programs from the University of Passau so that the results might not be representative for a more heterogeneous population pool.

## **9 CONCLUSION**

In the context of a seminar at the University of Passau, an experiment has been designed to explore to what extent expectations stated by the receivers can contribute to the

explanation of generous giving behavior in a dictator game. 130 voluntary students took part in the experiment consisting of different variants of a two-round dictator game.

The following results could be found: Dictators who have *actual* information about the receivers' expectations adapt the amount they share in the second round closer to the receivers' expectations than do dictators who only have *beliefs* about what a receiver might consider being acceptable. The identified difference, however, is not statistically significant. Still, the trend seems to be that if the information about the receivers' expectations is made available costlessly, at least some dictators seem to take into consideration this information when deciding how much to share. The next result is that when dictators adapt their amounts shared to the receivers' expectations, they do so in two ways: They raise as well as lower the shared amount if this is in line with what the receivers state to expect. The third finding has been that dictators who are willing to pay for the information are equally those who adapt their giving to the receivers' expectations compared to those dictators in T2 who do not buy the information. This means that buying the information can be interpreted as a sign for a high sensitivity towards other people's expectations since the dictators buying the information are also those who consider the receivers' expectations in their allocation decision. Finally, dictators who buy the information and are thus likely to have a high  $\alpha$  adapt the amount they share in round 2 much closer than do dictators in T1. The reason is that in T1, every dictator has the information about the receivers' expectations regardless of his sensitivity parameter  $\alpha$ , while in T2 only those dictators buy the information who would suffer a big loss in utility when the discrepancy between the amount shared in round 2 and the receivers' expectations would be too large.

On the one hand, these results are in line with what Dana et al. (2006) found out: Giving behavior can be explained by the dictator's desire to meet the receiver's expectations. In Dana et al., this result has been concretized by the number of dictators who were willing to exit the dictator game for \$1. In this study, this result has been shown by the lower deviation of the amount shared in round 2 from the receivers' expectations for those who exactly knew how much the receiver expected. On the other hand, this paper also yields new insights: The first difference is that actual expectations have been introduced. It could be explicitly shown that dictators do care about the *actual* receivers' expectations, either because they were forced to see the information or because they wished to. Further, the results provide evidence for the validity of the utility function Dana et al. suggested: The use of the absolute value makes sense because as it could be shown, dictators adapt the amount shared to the receivers' expectations in both directions. The sensitivity parameter  $\alpha$  also seems plausible since it could be shown that dictators who buy the information and are therefore likely to have a large  $\alpha$  also have been those who adapted the amount shared most to the receivers' expectations. It is therefore plausible to assume that the choice whether to buy the information or not depends on  $\alpha$  and a cost-benefit analysis: For individuals with a high  $\alpha$ , it is worth to spend money on the information but therefore being able to avoid a big utility loss due to the discrepancy between the amount shared and the receivers' expectations.

Summing up one can say that expectations are one component among many others that can contribute to explain giving behavior. Even if the importance of social preferences in human interactions cannot be negated, their role in explaining human behavior should be regarded with caution. Further research, especially conducting the experiment with real monetary incentive, seems to be necessary to ensure the predictive power of expectations.

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## APPENDIX

**Herzlich Willkommen!**

Vielen Dank für ihre Bereitschaft, an zwei kurzen Experimenten teilzunehmen.

Bevor das erste Experiment startet, einige allgemeine Erläuterungen vorab:

Mit den Experimenten wollen wir Erkenntnisse über menschliches Verhalten gewinnen. Die Teilnehmer an den Experimenten befinden sich alle hier im Raum und nehmen an denselben Experimenten teil. Alle Teilnehmer sind anonym und können sich nicht untereinander absprechen. Auch ihre Entscheidungen und Angaben werden anonym ausgewertet.

Bitte verhalten Sie sich während der Experimente ruhig und sprechen Sie nicht mit ihrem Nachbarn. Beachten Sie, dass es während der Experimente zu Wartezeiten kommen kann. Haben Sie einen Bildschirm einmal verlassen, kann dieser nicht erneut aufgerufen werden.

Die erzielten Gewinne können leider nicht ausbezahlt werden. Versuchen Sie dennoch sich vorzustellen und sich so zu verhalten, als würde um echtes Geld gespielt werden.

Auf der folgenden Seite wird der Ablauf des ersten Experimentes erklärt. Bitte lesen Sie die Anleitung sorgfältig durch und heben Sie ihre Hand im Falle noch offener Fragen. Ein Spielleiter kommt dann zu Ihnen.

Sie können jetzt mit dem ersten Experiment beginnen: Klicken Sie dazu auf 'Experiment starten'.

Welcoming speech if experiment is conducted at first

**Herzlich Willkommen zum zweiten Experiment!**

Nochmals vielen Dank für ihre Teilnahme!

Bevor das zweite Experiment startet, einige allgemeine Erläuterungen vorab:

Bitte beachten Sie, dass die beiden Experimente unabhängig voneinander sind und unterschiedliche Forschungsfragen zum Gegenstand haben.

Auf der folgenden Seite wird der Ablauf des zweiten Experimentes erklärt. Bitte lesen Sie die Anleitung sorgfältig durch und heben Sie ihre Hand im Falle noch offener Fragen. Ein Spielleiter kommt dann zu Ihnen.

Sie können jetzt mit dem zweiten Experiment beginnen: Klicken Sie dazu auf 'Experiment starten'.

Welcoming speech if experiment is conducted at second

### Spielanleitung

Das nachfolgende Spiel umfasst 2 Teilnehmer: Spieler 1 und Spieler 2. Die Zuteilung der Teilnehmer erfolgt zufällig und die Spielpartner interagieren anonym.

Spieler 1 erhält einen Betrag von 100 Euro. Über diesen Betrag kann Spieler 1 frei verfügen. Er kann entscheiden, wie er den Betrag zwischen sich und Spieler 2 aufteilen möchte. Es können sämtliche Beträge zwischen 0 und 100 in ganzen Zahlen an Spieler 2 abgegeben werden. Nachdem Spieler 1 eine Entscheidung getroffen hat, wird Spieler 2 darüber informiert, wie viel ihm Spieler 1 abgegeben hat.

Wenn Sie die Spielanleitung gelesen haben, können Sie fortfahren, indem Sie auf 'weiter' klicken.

weiter

Instructions for Dictator and Receiver

Sie sind **Spieler 1**.

Sie erhalten einen Betrag von 100 Euro. Sie haben nun zu entscheiden, ob bzw. wie viel Sie an Spieler 2 abgeben möchten. Es sind sämtliche Beträge zwischen 0 und 100 in ganzen Zahlen möglich. Nach ihrer Entscheidung wird Spieler 2 über den Betrag informiert, den Sie an ihn abgeben.

Bitte treffen Sie nun eine Entscheidung und wählen Sie den Betrag, den Sie an Spieler 2 abgeben möchten. Durch Scrollen an der Leiste können Sie alle Beträge zwischen 0 und 100 wählen.

Ich möchte Spieler 2 folgenden Betrag abgeben: 0  100

Nachdem Sie einen Betrag gewählt hast, können Sie fortfahren, indem Sie auf 'weiter' klicken.

weiter

Dictator Round 1



**Bevor** Spieler 2 erfahren hat, wie Sie entschieden haben, wurde ihm folgende Frage gestellt:

*Weichen Betrag, den Spieler 1 Ihnen sendet, halten Sie für akzeptabel, d.h. welchen Betrag in Euro sollte Spieler 1 Ihnen ihrer Meinung nach mindestens schicken?*

Was glauben Sie, wie Spieler 2 diese Frage beantwortet hat?

Durch Scrollen an der Leiste können Sie alle Beträge zwischen 0 und 100 wählen.

Ich denke, dass Spieler 2 auf die obige Frage folgenden Betrag geantwortet hat: 0  100

Nachdem Sie einen Betrag gewählt haben, können Sie fortfahren, indem Sie auf 'weiter' klicken.

Dictator Round 1

Spieler 2 wurde darüber informiert, dass er 20 Euro von Ihnen erhalten hat.

Da Sie aus ihrer Anfangsausstattung von 100 Euro einen Betrag von 20 Euro abgegeben haben, beträgt ihr Gewinn in dieser Runde **80** Euro.

Sie können fortfahren, indem Sie auf 'weiter' klicken.

Dictator Round 1

Sie sind **Spieler 2**.

Spieler 1 erhält einen Betrag von 100 Euro. Er kann entscheiden, ob bzw. wie viel er an Sie abgeben möchte. Es sind sämtliche Beträge zwischen 0 und 100 in ganzen Zahlen möglich. Nach seiner Entscheidung werden Sie über den Betrag informiert, den Spieler 1 Ihnen gesendet hat.

Bitte warten Sie.

Receiver Round 1

Während Sie auf die Entscheidung von Spieler 1 warten:

Welchen Betrag, den Spieler 1 Ihnen sendet, halten Sie für akzeptabel, d.h. welchen Betrag in Euro sollte Spieler 1 Ihnen ihrer Meinung nach mindestens schicken?

Durch Scrollen an der Leiste können Sie alle Beträge zwischen 0 und 100 wählen.

Ich finde, Spieler 1 sollte mir mindestens den folgenden Betrag abgeben: 0  100

Nachdem Sie einen Betrag gewählt haben, können Sie fortfahren, indem Sie auf 'weiter' klicken.

Receiver Round 1

Spieler 1 hat entschieden, Ihnen einen Betrag von **20 Euro** abzugeben.

Ihr Gewinn beträgt in dieser Runde somit 20 Euro.

Sie können fortfahren, indem Sie auf 'weiter' klicken.

Receiver Round 1

**Das Spiel wird nun eine weitere Runde lang gespielt.**

Die erzielten Gewinne aus beiden Runden werden am Ende addiert. Sie spielen nach wie vor mit dem gleichen Spieler 2.

Zur Erinnerung: Sie erhalten einen Betrag von 100 Euro und können entscheiden, ob bzw. wie viel Sie an Spieler 2 abgeben möchten. Nach ihrer Entscheidung wird Spieler 2 über den Betrag informiert, den Sie ihm abgeben.

Bitte treffen Sie nun eine Entscheidung und wählen Sie den Betrag, den Sie an Spieler 2 abgeben möchten. Durch Scrollen an der Leiste können Sie alle ganzzahligen Beträge zwischen 0 und 100 wählen.

Ich möchte Spieler 2 folgenden Betrag abgeben:

Nachdem Sie einen Betrag gewählt haben, können Sie fortfahren, indem Sie auf 'weiter' klicken.

Dictator Round 2 (T0)

**Das Spiel wird nun eine weitere Runde lang gespielt.**

Die erzielten Gewinne aus beiden Runden werden am Ende addiert. Sie spielen nach wie vor mit dem gleichen Spieler 1.

Zur Erinnerung: Spieler 1 erhält einen Betrag von 100 Euro und kann entscheiden, ob bzw. wie viel er Ihnen abgeben möchte. Nachdem Spieler 1 eine Entscheidung getroffen hat, werden Sie über den Betrag informiert, den Spieler 1 Ihnen abgibt.

Warten Sie nun, bis Spieler 1 eine Entscheidung getroffen hat.

Receiver Round 2 (T0)

**Das Spiel wird nun eine weitere Runde lang gespielt.**

Die erzielten Gewinne aus beiden Runden werden am Ende addiert. Sie spielen nach wie vor mit dem gleichen Spieler 2.

Zur Erinnerung: Sie erhalten einen Betrag von 100 Euro und können entscheiden, ob bzw. wie viel Sie an Spieler 2 abgeben möchten. Nach ihrer Entscheidung wird Spieler 2 über den Betrag informiert, den Sie ihm abgeben.

Zusätzlich haben Sie nun die Möglichkeit, auf folgende Information zurückzugreifen:

*Auf die Frage: Welchen Betrag, den Spieler 1 Ihnen sendet, halten Sie für akzeptabel, d.h. welchen Betrag in Euro sollte Spieler 1 Ihnen ihrer Meinung nach mindestens schicken? hat Spieler 2 folgende Antwort gegeben:*

*Ich finde, Spieler 1 sollte mir mindestens 40 Euro abgeben.*

Bitte treffen Sie nun eine Entscheidung und wählen Sie den Betrag, den Sie an Spieler 2 abgeben möchten. Durch Scrollen an der Leiste können Sie alle ganzzahligen Beträge zwischen 0 und 100 wählen.

Ich möchte Spieler 2 folgenden Betrag abgeben:  100

Nachdem Sie einen Betrag gewählt haben, können Sie fortfahren, indem Sie auf 'weiter' klicken.

**weiter**

Dictator Round 2 (T1)

**Das Spiel wird nun eine weitere Runde lang gespielt.**

Die erzielten Gewinne aus beiden Runden werden am Ende addiert. Sie spielen nach wie vor mit dem gleichen Spieler 1.

Zur Erinnerung: Spieler 1 erhält einen Betrag von 100 Euro und kann entscheiden, ob bzw. wie viel er Ihnen abgeben möchte. Nachdem Spieler 1 eine Entscheidung getroffen hat, werden Sie über den Betrag informiert, den Spieler 1 Ihnen abgibt.

Ihre Antwort auf die Frage, welchen Betrag Sie für akzeptabel halten, wurde Spieler 1 am Anfang der 2. Runde übermittelt.

Warten Sie nun, bis Spieler 1 eine Entscheidung getroffen hat.

Receiver Round 2 (T1)

**Das Spiel wird nun eine weitere Runde lang gespielt.**

Die erzielten Gewinne aus beiden Runden werden am Ende addiert. Sie spielen nach wie vor mit dem gleichen Spieler 2.

Zur Erinnerung: Sie erhalten einen Betrag von 100 Euro und können entscheiden, ob bzw. wie viel Sie an Spieler 2 abgeben möchten. Nach ihrer Entscheidung wird Spieler 2 über den Betrag informiert, den Sie ihm abgeben.

Zusätzlich haben Sie nun die Möglichkeit, folgende Information käuflich zu erwerben, bevor Sie eine Entscheidung treffen:

Sie können die Antwort auf die Frage: *Welchen Betrag, den Spieler 1 Ihnen sendet, halten Sie für akzeptabel, d.h. welchen Betrag in Euro sollte Spieler 1 Ihnen ihrer Meinung nach mindestens schicken?* für 5 Euro kaufen.

Entscheiden Sie sich für 'ja', wird Ihnen die Information angezeigt, bevor Sie eine Aufteilung wählen. Am Ende des Spiels werden Ihnen die Kosten in Höhe von 5 Euro von ihrem Gewinn abgezogen.

Entscheiden Sie sich für 'nein', treffen Sie eine Entscheidung, ohne die Information zu erhalten.

Entscheiden Sie sich nun, ob Sie die Information kaufen möchten oder nicht. Klicken Sie dazu die entsprechende Option an.

Ich möchte die Information kaufen  Ja  
 Nein

Sie können fortfahren, indem Sie auf 'weiter' klicken.

weiter

Dictator Round 2 (T2)

Spieler 2 hat folgende Antwort auf die Frage gegeben, welchen Betrag er für akzeptabel hält.  
*Ich finde, Spieler 1 sollte mir mindestens 40 Euro abgeben.*

Bitte treffen Sie nun eine Entscheidung und wählen Sie den Betrag, den Sie an Spieler 2 abgeben möchten. Durch Scrollen an der Leiste können Sie alle ganzzahligen Beträge zwischen 0 und 100 wählen.

Ich möchte Spieler 2 folgenden Betrag abgeben: 0  100

Nachdem Sie einen Betrag gewählt haben, können Sie fortfahren, indem Sie auf 'weiter' klicken.

[weiter](#)

Dictator Round 2 (T2)

Spieler 2 wurde darüber informiert, dass er 35 Euro von Ihnen erhalten hat.

Da Sie aus Ihrer Anfangsausstattung von 100 Euro einen Betrag von 35 Euro abgegeben haben, beträgt Ihr Gewinn in dieser Runde **65** Euro.

Insgesamt haben Sie somit aus beiden Runden einen Gewinn von **145** Euro erzielt.

Sie können fortfahren, indem Sie auf 'weiter' klicken.

[weiter](#)

Dictator Round 2 (T2)

**Das Spiel wird nun eine weitere Runde lang gespielt.**

Die erzielten Gewinne aus beiden Runden werden am Ende addiert. Sie spielen nach wie vor mit dem gleichen Spieler 1.

Zur Erinnerung: Spieler 1 erhält einen Betrag von 100 Euro und kann entscheiden, ob bzw. wie viel er Ihnen abgeben möchte. Nachdem Spieler 1 eine Entscheidung getroffen hat, werden Sie über den Betrag informiert, den Spieler 1 Ihnen abgibt.

Spieler 1 erhält am Anfang der 2. Runde die Möglichkeit, die Information über den Betrag, den Sie für akzeptabel halten, für **5 Euro** zu kaufen.

Warten Sie nun, bis Spieler 1 entschieden hat, die Information zu kaufen oder nicht.

Receiver Round 2 (T2)

Spieler 1 hat 5 Euro bezahlt, um zu erfahren, welchen Betrag Sie für akzeptabel halten.

Bitte warten Sie, bis Spieler 1 entschieden hat, wie viel er Ihnen abgeben möchte.

Receiver Round 2 (T2)

Spieler 1 hat entschieden, Ihnen einen Betrag von **35** Euro abzugeben.

Ihr Gewinn beträgt in dieser Runde somit 35 Euro.

Insgesamt haben Sie somit aus beiden Runden einen Gewinn von **55** Euro erzielt.

Sie können fortfahren, indem Sie auf 'weiter' klicken.

Receiver Round 2 (T2)

**Fragebogen**

Bitte beantworten Sie zum Abschluss die nachfolgenden Fragen. Ihre Angaben werden anonym ausgewertet und haben keinen Einfluss auf das Spielergebnis.

Geschlecht  männlich  
 weiblich

Alter

Studiengang  BWL/WL  
 Governance and Public Policy  
 Kommunikationswissenschaft  
 Medien und Kommunikation/Sprache und Text  
 Informatik/Internet Computing  
 Lehramt  
 Rechtswissenschaft  
 Sonstige

Wenn Sie alle Fragen beantwortet haben, können Sie fortfahren, indem Sie auf 'Experiment beenden' klicken.

Questionnaire