



**Who Accepts Bribery?  
Evidence from a Global Household Survey**

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# Who Accepts Bribery? Evidence from a Global Household Survey

Johann Graf Lambsdorff 

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## Abstract

This paper processes responses from households in 66 countries to address differences in the extent to which bribes and gifts are considered acceptable. Levels of acceptance differ substantially from one country to another, but they do not conform to popular expectations: Respondents in rich, western countries do not exhibit lower levels of acceptance. A higher acceptance of bribery can be observed in former colonies and those without a majority religion. Acceptance is higher among those who paid a bribe. Buddhists and less educated judge more situation-specific, accepting more often if they paid bribes themselves. Culture shapes attitudes towards bribery, but the western world fails to exhibit the expected moral rigor.

*JEL Classification:* D73, C83

*Keywords:* Civil Liberty, Colonialism, Corruption, Cognitive Dissonance, Moral Reasoning, Moral Superiority, Religion

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## 1 Moral Superiority

There is widespread belief that “western societies” apply a more rigorous definition of bribery. They are supposed to adhere to a stricter standard of ethics when judging acceptable behavior and are thus superior in their moral standards. For example, Bayley, (1966: 721) argues:

"The western observer is faced with an uncomfortable choice. He can adhere to the Western definition, in which case he lays himself open to the charge of being censorious and he finds that he is condemning not aberrant behavior but normal, acceptable operating procedure.... On the other hand, he may face up to the fact that corruption, if it requires moral censure, is culturally conditioned ... [and] it may be necessary then to assert in the same breath that an official accepts gratuities but is not corrupt."<sup>1</sup>

In this spirit, Nye (1967: 419-423) remarks his support to Bayley and notes:

“Attitudes toward corruption vary greatly. In certain West African countries, observers have reported little widespread sense of indignation about corruption... Very often, traditional sectors of the populace are likely to be more tolerant of corruption than some of the modern sectors.”

Huntington (1968: 254) considers corruption to be inevitable in transition countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia as compared to the “Atlantic world”. For him, the reason rests with a conflict concerning acceptable norms. A transition from traditional forms of organization to modern forms is seen to go along with a change in values towards equality of rights and universalistic norms. During this transition, Huntington notes:

“Behavior which was acceptable and legitimate according to traditional norms becomes unacceptable and corrupt when viewed through modern eyes. Corruption in a modernizing society is thus in part not so much the result of the deviance of behavior from accepted norms as it is the deviance of norms from the established patterns of behavior. New standards and criteria of what is right and wrong lead to a condemnation of at least some traditional behavior patterns as corrupt.”

Equipped with a similar spirit, Gardiner (1993: 26-27) asks:

“... the answer to ‘Is it acceptable for a contractor to take the government purchasing officer and his family on a two-week vacation on the Riviera?’ or ‘Can the Minister

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<sup>1</sup> This viewpoint has lately been termed “cultural relativism”, (Larmour 2008: 225). This classification is not in line with standard definitions. Cultural relativism defies the chance to compare ethical standards across cultures, as their reference system is regarded to be different and not well understood by cultural outsiders. Cultural relativism, for example in the work of Boas, Herskovits and Sumner, established a research methodology that was opposed to ethnocentrism. When regarding ones own ethnic groups or culture to be centrally important, this ethnocentric viewpoint has often resulted in beliefs of one’s own group’s superiority. Against this notion, cultural relativists recommend that researchers should not apply the categories (and also not the ethical norms) they are acquainted with when studying foreign countries. This debate certainly differs from the one highlighted here, which focuses on some authors who believe that comparisons can be made (which this paper attempts as well) and that ethical standards in some countries are more stringent. With regards to the latter idea, this paper will produce surprising results, not at all in line with “western” ethnocentric beliefs. I am grateful to Thomas Wunsch for clarifying this point to me.

for Highways award a construction contract to a company to which he is a part owner?' often depend on where the event takes place. In some nations, the government may not have rules forbidding these acts; or public expectations may be that they are 'normal' in that society".

On pages 36-38 Gardiner notes:

"Some nations feel that "gift-giving" or "dash" payments are acceptable while other nations have very detailed codes of conduct regulating both legislators and bureaucrats... Similar variations in attitudes appear in former colonies where a European legal system was superimposed on traditional codes and values of the native population: official practices accepted by everyone in pre-colonial days only became "improper" when colonial values were introduced."

Also Heidenheimer (1970: 28) notes that some non-western political systems may promote acceptance of corruption. He describes a "familist" system as one where loyalty to a group and advancement of its interests is all that counts. He argues: "In the familist-based system all of the types of behavior that are considered corrupt by the standards of Western legal norms are considered ... acceptable, by the bulk of the population".

More recently, Pujas and Rhodes (2002: 740) posit: "What is 'illegal' or 'corrupt' in some societies may be considered acceptable in others. What the British would see as nepotism or shameless patronage might be considered fair or even a moral duty elsewhere. It is the perception of the practice that makes it corrupt and scandalous. Societies that modernize and democratize tend to move, albeit unevenly, through different phases of perception".<sup>2</sup>

These viewpoints have been adopted by business representatives. Lord Young, former head of Cable and Wireless and Secretary of State for Trade and Industry for the United Kingdom, expressed in a BBC interview in 1994:<sup>3</sup>

"Now when you're talking about kickbacks, you're talking about something that's illegal in this country, and that of course you wouldn't dream of doing ... but there are parts of the world I've been to where we all know it happens, and if you want to be in business, you have to do."

Also some survey data at the cross-country level has generated support for a "moral superiority". Treisman (2000) and Paldam (2001) observe that, controlling for other important cross-country variables, in countries with a large fraction of Reform Christianity corruption is lower. Treisman (2000: 428) offers various explanations for these findings, one of them is that these countries have developed institutions that perform better in controlling corruption, for

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<sup>2</sup> There are also resulting consequences for measuring corruption. Sandholtz and Gray (2003) argue: "The principal, and perennial, objection to deploying a universal definition of corruption is that it obliterates the patent differences in how specific societies define corrupt acts. That is, practices that are considered corrupt in one society may be acceptable in another. A related objection is that the general definition is essentially a Western one, and that it distorts social realities by forcing non-western cultures into Western categories. Indeed, the private-public distinction itself may be a Western invention. We would respond with two lines of argument. First, if one were to concede the irreducible cultural particularity of standards of corruption, then comparative, cross-national research on the topic would be impossible, as some might argue that it is." On a similar token, Philp (2006: 50) notes: "...the most fundamental difficulty for corruption measurement arises from the problems I have indicated concerning the definition of corruption and the variability of governmental and business practices in different parts of the world...there is likely to be variation in the way that public office is conceived, variation in the types of activities which are seen as acceptable or unacceptable on the part of public officials..."

<sup>3</sup> See (The Times, London 11 June 1997: 29).

example due to a vibrant, autonomous civil society that monitors the state more effectively. Another idea is that Reform Christians cultivate a more intense and unforgiving moralism, (Treisman 2000: 439).

Such differences in moral strictness have been eagerly employed by businesspeople in an attempt to justify their behavior abroad. For example, the Federation of German Industry, like many other German industrial bodies, has for a long time in the 1990s regarded corruption to be considered culturally accepted in many less developed countries. I often encountered panel discussions where such positions were stated. Many colleagues from industrial countries report similar attitudes from business representatives. We can summarize the position of moral superiority in the following hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1:** Acceptance of bribery and gift-giving is less pronounced in rich countries.

**Hypothesis 2:** Acceptance of bribery and gift-giving is more pronounced in countries that were colonies in the last 100 years.

**Hypothesis 3:** Acceptance of bribes and gift-giving is less pronounced in Western Europe and North America.

**Hypothesis 4:** Acceptance of bribes and gift-giving is less pronounced in countries where citizens enjoy civil liberties, such as economic freedom and freedom of the press (which marks a characteristic of western countries).

**Hypothesis 5:** Acceptance of bribes and gift-giving is less pronounced among Reform Christians.

## 2 The Universalistic Doctrine

The opposite viewpoint has widely been labeled a “universalistic doctrine”, (Leys 1965: 217; Larmour 2008: 237). Wraith and Simpkins (1964: 45), whom Leys criticizes, provide a strong position in this respect:

“The wrong that is done is done in the full knowledge that it is wrong, for the concept of theft does not vary as between Christian and Muslim, African and European, or primitive man and Minister of the Crown”.

This position is not necessarily the one of a social scientist who tries to trace the causes of moral reasoning. Some may claim, for example, that subjective moral preferences are unimportant. If morality is thought to emanate from divine, natural or logical considerations, humans sentiments would play no role. Likewise, some moral preferences may be thought to be inferior to a global standard and deserve to be disregarded. One may, for example, find widespread support for the idea that torture should nowhere be accepted. Those who advance this idea will easily find consensus that diverting preferences should play no role in politics. The rejection of torture is a normative moral statement that seeks universal support. The universalistic doctrine in this sense is a normative crusade. Whether such a normative statement can also be applied to corruption is an important question, but beyond the scope of this study.

Such normative statements must be distinguished from a positive analysis that seeks to trace the causes of moral reasoning. Such an analysis would set up hypotheses that are subject to falsification. A strong version of the universal doctrine in this respect may posit that all societies share the same understanding of corruption. But such a claim sounds rather untenable. Believing that culture, economy and the particular environment should not matter at all in how attitudes towards corruption are shaped, certainly, is difficult to reconcile with intuition.

Adherents to a universalistic doctrine have rather followed a more modest claim: They are in opposition to those who claim a moral superiority. Alatas (1968) has been an early writer to reject the idea that bribes are accepted in non-western countries. The West, he argued, portrayed people from less developed countries as being incapable of telling right from wrong. He argues instead that just because individuals violate norms one should not conclude that these norms are inexistent. “Moral superiority” was also strongly opposed by Peter Eigen, founder of Transparency International. He argued that cultural acceptability is merely a pretext by western companies, aimed at continuing with their active bribery. He argues (1996: 160):

“This ‘cultural argument’ – that corruption is an accepted practice among developing countries – is one of the strongest barriers to rooting out the phenomenon.”

He claims that nowhere is bribery accepted. At best, customs of gift-giving differ from one country to another. But corruption should be clearly separated from such practices, which are never camouflaged but done in the open. He suggests that societies condemn bribery equally. Differences in attitudes towards corruption would rather be linked to individual misconduct. Criminals will cook excuses for their infractions. They interpret social norms with a self-serving bias and exculpate their misdeeds by adjusting downward their standards. But these definitions will not be accepted among the many victims of bribery. In the words of Olusegun Obasanjo, a former anti-corruption activist and President of Nigeria between 1999 and 2007 (cited from Pope (2000: 9):

“I shudder at how an integral aspect of our culture could be taken as the basis for rationalising otherwise despicable behaviour. In the African concept of appreciation and hospitality, the gift is usually a token. It is not demanded. The value is usually in the spirit rather than in the material worth. It is usually done in the open, and never in secret. Where it is excessive, it becomes an embarrassment and it is returned. If anything, corruption has perverted and destroyed this aspect of our culture.”

Denying that culture matters for moral judgment is certainly untenable. But this is not necessarily the viewpoint of adherents of a universal doctrine. The question is rather whether moral judgments can be ordered qualitatively and whether such an order can be linked to cultural preconditions. While a universalistic doctrine may thus allow for a culture-specific impact on moral development, it would reject the four hypotheses mentioned above.

### **3 Education, Cognitive Dissonance and Reciprocity**

One system for ordering moral development has been proposed by Kohlberg (1981). He identifies stages of morality according to their level of reasoning, distinguishing blind obedience to rules or interests from considerate evaluation of consequences for societal well-being. He thus asserts that moral judgment is not only due to affects and preferences but also

due to competence. Evidence has been obtained to see that children advance in the level of reasoning as they grow and that more educated subjects are more likely to reach the highest stage of moral reasoning. In the tradition of Kohlberg some researchers have sought to find ethnic and cross-country differences in moral reasoning.

But these levels of reasoning must be distinguished from the moral affects such as preferences, orientation or values. One cannot link low levels of reasoning to an acceptance of bribery. For example, bribery might be rejected by those being obedient to simple rules. It may also be rejected after applying higher levels of reasoning and observing how society may advance without bribery. Likewise, bribery may be justified by observing individual advantages or by more advanced levels of reasoning, for example when preferring a more anarchic society. Kohlberg's approach to moral development cannot be applied to our concern with respect to the strictness of a moral code. Even if more educated people exhibit a higher level of moral reasoning this does not imply that they reject bribery more often. Still, it is worthwhile to test in how far education has an impact. Even when observing that Kohlberg may not be supportive to the following hypothesis, we suggest:

**Hypothesis 6:** Acceptance of bribes and gift-giving is higher among respondents with lower levels of education.

Another impact on acceptance of bribery deserves recognition: Acceptance of bribery might be higher among those who paid a bribe themselves. It is known, for example, that smokers suffer from the conflict that their habit endangers their life and rationalize their behavior by downplaying the evidence that smoking shortens people's life, (Baron and Byrne 2004). This goes back to the classical concept of cognitive dissonance. When ideas are in conflict with each other, people alleviate the conflict by adjusting their attitudes and beliefs, (Festinger 1957). We can thus hypothesize that the acceptance of bribery is framed by ones own past actions.

**Hypothesis 7:** Acceptance of bribes and gift-giving is less pronounced among bribers.

#### 4 Survey Design

Investigating attitudes towards corrupt is not novel. A first approach to measuring and explaining individual moral attitudes towards bribery has relied on data from the World Value Survey: "Tell whether you think each of the following statements (10) can always be justified, (1) never justified, or (2-9) something in between.... Accepting a bribe in the course of one's duties?" 75% of respondents opt for the strict claim that a bribe is never justified, (Swamy et. al 2001: 29). Swamy et al. (2001) and Gatti et al. (2003) observe that women, married, religiously active, highly educated, employed, less wealthy, and older individuals are less likely to justify bribery. At a cross-country level, You and Khagram (2005) observe that individuals from democratic countries and those with a more even distribution of income less justify bribe taking. Thus, a social norm stating that bribes are unacceptable seems to be eroded by inequality and authoritarianism. Surprisingly, You and Khagram find that respondents in countries with higher per capita income are more likely to justify the acceptance of bribes.

These pieces of evidence are indicative on perceptions of bribery and how respective social norms may differ from one country to another. But there is a caveat: The findings relate to the term "bribe" and less to the underlying action. Consider a respondent who never justifies a



bribe, a response that would be coded as a strict social norm. But instead the response may be due to a restricted scope of the term “bribe”. For example, the respondent may justify nepotistic networking and distinguish this from other cases of bribery, applying the term “bribe” only in rare instances. His justifying attitude would go unnoticed and by mistake he would be counted as applying a strict norm. Another respondent may justify a bribe and his reply be coded as more permissive. Be she may have applied a broad definition of the term bribe which embraces also cases where individuals fall victim to extortion. An adequate coding should not regard her as being more permissive. Overall, the term bribe is open to different circumstances which were not controlled in the above-mentioned studies. This is a shortage the current study seeks to overcome.

I employ responses to the 2009 survey “Voice of the People”, carried out in 49 countries by Gallup International, supported by an identical questionnaire employed by Transparency International in another 17 countries.<sup>4</sup> Results were obtained for 71132 households in 66 countries. Fieldwork was carried out between October 2008 and March 2009. For a comprehensive description of the survey see Transparency International (2009). I was granted the chance to implement the following questions that succeeded a sequence of other questions on corruption.

We would like to find out both what you consider to be bribery and what you consider to be acceptable actions in dealing with public officials. Imagine a friend of yours wants to open up a shop. To do this, he applies for a business license from a local public office.

1) Upon entering the public office, the public official looks at the application and describes how complicated it can be to get a license. He complains about his workload and how much paperwork it takes to provide the license. Your friend the shopkeeper is worried his application for a business license may be rejected. He offers a payment, roughly equal to five times the price of a good restaurant meal. The public official takes the money and issues the license.

1.1) Was the public official’s behavior acceptable? (Yes/No/NA)

1.2) Was the shopkeeper’s behavior acceptable? (Yes/No/NA)

2) Imagine a different situation for your friend, the shopkeeper. While he is applying for the business license, the public official he is dealing with mentions the amount of paperwork and difficulties involved, but he still manages to issue the license. As he hands the license to the shopkeeper, he mentions how thankful many of his clients are for his work. A tipping box is located outside the public official’s office. The shopkeeper puts banknotes into this tipping box, roughly equal in value to five times the price of a good restaurant meal.

2.1) Was the public official’s behavior acceptable? (Yes/No/NA)

2.2) Was the shopkeeper’s behavior acceptable? (Yes/No/NA)

3) Imagine yet another situation for your friend, the shopkeeper. He knows that his nephew is well acquainted with the local public office, so he asks his nephew to help get the business license. The nephew sets out for the public office and returns soon thereafter with the business license, without mentioning how this was arranged. A few months later, the shopkeeper’s nephew asks the shopkeeper to provide a donation to the annual party of the license department in the local public office. The shopkeeper then delivers a gift for the party, roughly equal in value to five times the price of a good restaurant meal. He also attends the party and thanks the responsible public official for issuing the license.

3.1) Was the public official’s behavior acceptable? (Yes/No/NA)

3.2) Was the shopkeeper’s behavior acceptable? (Yes/No/NA)

The questions represent vignettes, hypothetical descriptions of situations, and ask for respondents’ evaluation. The usage of vignettes is a standard tool in social sciences, employed in particular to improve interpersonal comparability. King et al. (2003), for example, observe

<sup>4</sup> Initially data was also gathered in Liberia and Sierra Leone. But questions regarding the validity of these surveys were not addressed satisfactorily. For example, it remained unclear how a nationwide sample could have been assembled in spite of the adverse conditions of a poor and war-torn country. Also, translations into local language remained unavailable.

that simple questions on political efficacy produce counterfactual results. Respondents in Mexico considered their elections to be of little use while Chinese respondents believe that their electoral system gives them a say in government. These findings can be explained once using vignettes and observing that Chinese respondents assign a high political efficacy to hypothetical descriptions of electoral impacts while Mexican respondents assign lower grades.

The three vignettes address favors being exchanged between a shopkeeper and a public servant. They differ with respect to how explicitly the public servant demands a favor, how clearly rules are violated, whether communication is explicit in linking a bribe/gift to the granting of a license, how direct the interaction is and how openly favors are exchanged. While in option 1 the violation is rather clear, option 3 describes a more distant exchange where a quid pro quo is least obvious.<sup>5</sup>

The vignettes address a street-level situation that respondents should be able to familiarize. Vignettes relating to the police or the judiciary were also considered. As revealed by Transparency International (2009), households mostly experience bribes to the police (24 % out of those who report having paid a bribe), suggesting that such situations can be well judged by respondents. However, payments to policemen often represent a type of extortion, which should be distinguished from the voluntary payments that are made in a bribe transaction. The same may be true of bribes to the judiciary (reported by 16%). Bribes to land services (15 %) and registry and permit services (13%) were also quite common and reveal similarities to the example of the shopkeeper. This suggests that the vignette addresses circumstances not unfamiliar to most respondents.

The favor is expressed in units of good restaurant meals so as to preserve purchasing power across all countries. Alternative approaches with explicit values in local currency would have required complex algorithms, finding the right (market or purchasing power adjusted)<sup>6</sup> exchange rate and complicated two-digit values to preserve equivalence across countries. Apparently, this would have been confusing to interviewers and respondents.

The usage of vignettes ascertains that all respondents judged on identical acts, irrespective of whether they would use the term “bribe”. This was not guaranteed in the approach by the World Value Survey, who confronted respondents with the term “bribe”, a term whose interpretation may differ from one individual to another and may further suffer from translation. Rather than using the term “justify”, as in the World Value Survey, I employ the term “acceptable”. While this difference is only marginal, it was felt that “justification” confronts a respondent with the possibility of guilt and self-defense, which may overshadow the immediate attitudes by an individual.<sup>7</sup>

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
<sup>5</sup> A common approach would be to randomize the order of the three options so as to disallow the sequence to have a bearing on the results. This was not possible due to technical reasons of survey implementation.

<sup>6</sup> As is well documented by the Big-Mac index, annually published by the Economist, official exchange rates would misrepresent the actual purchasing power because non-traded goods are dearer in more developed countries. I note in passing that a business license, sold for a bribe, represents a non-traded good.

<sup>7</sup> This term, certainly, may be judged differently from one individual to another. For example, an act that falls short of being acceptable may invoke a high level of cognitive dissonance among some individuals but leave others rather indifferent. Considering an act as unacceptable may thus be considered a harsh judgment by some and less so by others. These differences reveal how well a social norm is recognized by individuals. They are the essence to this study and not disturbing the investigation.

## 5 The Data

Figure 1 provides an aggregate view of the responses to the three vignettes. Overall, most types of behavior were considered unacceptable. I was surprised to see that 59% of respondents regarded the behavior of the shopkeeper in vignette 3 to be unacceptable. It cannot be precluded, however, that the previous descriptions that represent clearer bribe transactions may have overshadowed the third vignette and provided it with a less legitimate appearance.<sup>8</sup>



There is a slight tendency to rather accept the behavior by the shopkeeper and reject the public servant's behavior. This may indicate a global tendency to regard a public office as a commitment to honesty. To the contrary, a position in the private sector may be regarded more leniently and levels of acceptability are thus higher. But it is difficult to draw absolute inferences from this finding, as it critically depends on the wording employed for the vignettes.

A first problem emerged on how to deal with respondents who did not know (dk) or preferred to provide no answer (na). This question was important in particular because in some

<sup>8</sup> Due to technical reasons it was not possible to randomly rotate vignettes, as is practice elsewhere. This failure to rotate implies that respondents may consider the sequence of vignettes to have a certain meaning, or that impressions provided in the first vignette carry over to the subsequent ones. This may certainly impact on some respondents' judgment. This impact, however, applies to all respondents equally, such that interpersonal and cross-cultural comparisons are not impaired.

countries the share of such answers was particularly large. I apply a simple method by looking only at the “yes” responses, at those who accepted the behavior. While various alternatives have been processed, this approach produced the highest R<sup>2</sup> in the regressions. For the findings reported here this specification was immaterial.




Figure 2 reveals the sum of “yes” responses obtained for all three vignettes, depicted as the average across a whole country. The abscissa depicts acceptance of the shopkeeper’s behavior. The ordinate, likewise, depicts the extent to which public servant’s behavior was accepted. One observes a strong correlation between the two variables. Appendix C provides the complete dataset for the 66 countries alongside with the UN country codes.

The figure reveals some surprising results. Venezuela (VEN) and Morocco (MAR) are not the countries one expects for the highest standards of ethics. Iceland (ISL), Chile (CHL), Canada (CAN), Finland (FIN) and Denmark (DNK), on the other hand, obtain a solid position, somewhat in line with popular belief. The low positions for Pakistan (PAK), Cambodia (KHM), Moldova (MDA), Russia (RUS), Mongolia (MNG) and Nigeria (NGA) are again in line with popular expectations. But the low scores for Switzerland (CHE) and Austria (AUT) and the scores below average for UK (GBR) and USA (USA) come at surprise.

## 6 Cross-Country Regressions

Table 1 reports OLS regressions for country averages. Appendix B provides a description of the variables employed from external sources. The dependent variable in tables 1 is the data on the ordinate of figure 2, the sum of all accepted vignettes (out of three), averaged across countries.

Independent Variable	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
Constant	0.51 (11.0)	0.39 (15.1)	0.48 (14.5)	0.30 (6.3)	0.30 (4.2)
GDP per Head, 2007, per 10.000 US\$	-0.030 (-1.8)				
Colony, 100 Years		0.18 (3.2)			0.14 (1.7)
Dummy for Western Country			-0.09 (-1.9)		0.045 (0.8)
Absence of Civil Liberties				0.052 (2.8)	0.030 (1.1)
Obs.	63	66	66	62	62
R <sup>2</sup>	0.04	0.16	0.03	0.14	0.20
Jarque-Bera <sup>b)</sup>	6.2	3.6	7.3	1.2	1.5

a) White corrected t-statistics are in parentheses.  
b) The Jarque-Bera measures whether a series is normally distributed by considering its skewness and kurtosis. The assumption of a normal distribution can be clearly rejected for levels above 6

Binomial regressions provide some mild support to the first four hypotheses. Richer countries are characterized by less acceptance. Respondents in countries with a colonial history exhibit a higher level of acceptance. Western Europe and North America, labeled “western”, have slightly lower levels of acceptance. Also Civil liberties exert a strong influence. Where these are absent, respondents are more tolerant towards bribery. All regressions, however, reveal a low R<sup>2</sup>, alerting us that little can be solidly concluded about country differences in attitudes towards bribery.

Once testing for the variables simultaneously we observe that only the dummy variable for colonies retains a mildly significant impact. “western” now even obtains an unexpected positive sign, suggesting that acceptance is higher. Due to the high multicollinearity between GDP per head and “western” only the latter variable was included. When testing for GDP per head instead also this variable obtains the wrong sign. We thus do not find robust evidence that “western” or GDP per head play a role.

Some mild support is given to hypothesis 4, stating that civil liberties reduce the acceptance of bribery. Where civil liberties are curtailed (limited freedom of expression and belief; restricted personal autonomy; existence of human rights violations; substantial limitations of economic freedom) bribery finds more acceptance among respondents. One conjecture would be that bribery is accepted in these countries as an act of self-defense.

Table 2: Dependent Variable: Acceptability of bribes/gift-giving by Shopkeeper<sup>a)</sup>

Independent Variable	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
Constant	0.70 (-12.3)	0.57 (15.0)	0.66 (16.1)	0.47 (7.4)	0.45 (4.8)
GDP per Head, 2007, per 10.000 US\$	-0.031 (-1.6)				
Colony (After WW I)		0.19 (2.7)			0.15 (1.4)
Dummy for Western Country			-0.08 (-1.3)		0.08 (1.1)
Absence of Civil Liberties				0.057 (2.5)	0.040 (1.1)
Obs.	63	66	66	62	62
R <sup>2</sup>	0.03	0.12	0.01	0.11	0.16
Jarque-Bera <sup>b)</sup>	8.6	11.4	11.6	4.2	7.3

a) White corrected t-statistics are in parentheses.

b) The Jarque-Bera measures whether a series is normally distributed by considering its skewness and kurtosis. The assumption of a normal distribution can be clearly rejected for levels above 6

We obtain similar results for the shopkeeper, as reported in table 2. GDP per head and “western” are insignificant this time and again change sign when other variables are included (shown in regression 5 only for “western”). The dummy for colonies again obtains the strongest impact. Civil liberties exert a significant impact in regression 4, which retains some, albeit insignificant, influence when including the other variables.

All over the regressions in tables 1 and 2 allow us to reject hypotheses 1 and 3, while providing mild support for hypotheses 4 and some support for hypothesis 2. Observing that the strongest finding relates to the colonial dummy provides an unusual twist to the hypothesis of a “moral superiority”. May it be possible that former colonial powers share the responsibility for the higher acceptance of bribery and gift giving by having destroyed the moral fabric of their former colonies? It is beyond the scope of this study investigate these conjectures in more detail. There is unquestionable evidence, however, that people from “western” countries have little reason to point with their fingers at other countries.


## 7 Regressions at the Individual Level

Some of the regressions can be tested more accurately at the individual level. There might be concern, for example, that the preceding findings generalize excessively by depicting only country averages. There are likely to be differences within a country which remain undetected when looking only at averages. It therefore makes sense to investigate acceptance of bribery at the individual level. We are provided with respondents’ personal information on gender, educational background, religious affiliation and experience with bribery. This allows for a more nuanced determination of individual causes of the acceptability of bribes.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> There also exists data on age, income group and employment. This data, however, did not produce noteworthy results and is left out here.


One further question asked in the survey reads: “On the past 12 months, have you or anyone living in your household paid a bribe in any form? Yes/no/don’t know or no answer.” This is a measure of experiences with petty bribery. Too many respondents, unfortunately, in Morocco, El Salvador and Zambia did not answer this question, forcing us to disregard these countries. Allover, 77% of respondents denied having paid a bribe, while 16% admitted such payments. 7% provided no answer or did not know.

For regression analysis I employ a dependent variable that depicts the amount of vignettes (out of three) regarded acceptable, now for each respondent individually. It thus obtains the values 0, 1, 2 or 3. Figure 3 shows the data.



We start by investigating whether respondents who paid bribes exhibit a higher acceptance of such behavior. Indeed, as shown in figure 8, those who paid a bribe in the preceding 12 months report a higher acceptance. This is true for the data on the public servant as well as the shopkeeper. Table 4 reveals that this impact for the data on the public servant is significant.

**Figure 4: Bribers more often consider bribe/gift to be acceptable**




The impact of whether a bribe was paid may not only result from the respondents' cognitive dissonance. Already at the country-level there is likely to be a correlation for two reasons. First, norms are eroded where they are violated by others. A modified moral attitude is then sought that does not deliver the constant unease that is felt when observing violations. Second, when collectively bribery is accepted individuals face fewer social constraints when paying and taking bribes. This implies reverse causality: payment of bribes becomes more frequent in countries where this behavior is accepted.

These two effects can be separated out when controlling for countries, as is done in the regression 4, table 4. Dummy variables are introduced for all 57 countries considered in this regression, except of the USA, which served as a benchmark country for comparison. The coefficient for "Paid bribe" then depicts whether within the same country those paid a bribe are more accepting. Indeed, the coefficient remains significant, suggesting indeed that the respondents' cognitive dissonance affects whether bribery is accepted, in line with hypothesis 7.

Data on religion is not available for Armenia, Belarus, Chile, Georgia, India, Kenya and Morocco, forcing us to drop these countries. The composition of religions across all households is reported in figure 5. Unfortunately, the category Russian and Eastern Orthodox was confusing to respondents in Greece and the Ukraine, who regard themselves as Other Christians.





The regressions in table 4 do not include Catholicism, which served as a benchmark for comparison to the other religions. From regressions 1 and 2 we observe that Russian or Orthodox Christians, other religions, atheists and those who declined to report are less accepting while Other Christians, Hindus, Muslims and Buddhists are more accepting. These results remained robust to the inclusion of variables on gender and whether the respondent paid a bribe. Regression 3 controls for whether a respondent belongs to a religion that dominates in the respective country, that is, is picked by more than 50% of the country's respondents. We observe respondents who belong to a majority religion to be less accepting. Once controlling for this variable we observe that some minority religions (in particular atheists, those who declined refused to report, and other religion) are less accepting. While other religions partly reject bribes/gift-giving because they set the standards as a majority, these would reject even as minorities.

Controlling for countries is also important for judging on the impact of religion. Are Muslims, for example, more accepting because of their religious affiliation or due to their residence in countries where bribery is more accepted? Regression 4 reports the findings. All coefficients on religion drop to insignificance. For individuals it is more salient where they live as compared to their religious belief. Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists are more accepting because they live in countries where levels of acceptance are higher. If Catholics or Protestants enter these countries, there is no evidence that they maintain their moral standard. Religion has no significance of its own. Its impact correlates with country dummies. Relevance of religion may at best be addressed to collective achievements of a whole country, but at the individual level it fails to obtain significance.

Also the variable on majority religion becomes insignificant in regression 4. Within a given country adherents to the majority religion reveal no difference in attitude towards bribery as compared to minority religions. This suggests that in countries with a majority religion all citizens are equally adhering to a stricter standard, also those who belong to a minority. Overall, we find no support for hypothesis 5. Reform Christianity does not lower acceptance of bribes.

Table 4: Dependent Variable:  
Acceptability of bribes/gift-giving by Public Servant,  
Method: Maximum Likelihood Ordered Probit,  
Quadratic Hill Climbing.<sup>a)</sup>


Independent Variable	1.	2.	3.	4.
Paid Bribe		0.315 (23.1)	0.307 (22.5)	0.170 (11.3)
Male Respondent		0.037 (3.7)	0.034 (3.4)	0.026 (2.5)
Russian and Eastern Orthodox	-0.083 (-4.3)	-0.090 (-4.6)	-0.042 (-2.1)	0.034 (1.0)
Protestant	0.026 (1.5)	0.041 (2.3)	-0.053 (-2.9)	0.010 (0.4)
Other Christian	0.132 (6.6)	0.128 (6.3)	-0.043 (-2.0)	0.006 (0.3)
Hindu	0.325 (5.0)	0.309 (4.7)	0.115 (1.7)	0.084 (1.2)
Muslim	0.087 (6.1)	0.071 (5.0)	0.090 (6.3)	0.006 (0.2)
Jew	0.063 (1.3)	0.075 (1.6)	0.039 (0.8)	-0.099 (-1.5)
Bhuddist	0.254 (11.9)	0.223 (10.4)	0.238 (11.1)	0.038 (1.0)
Other	-0.050 (-1.3)	-0.036 (-1.0)	-0.232 (-6.1)	0.026 (0.6)
No religion	-0.094 (-5.1)	-0.075 (-4.0)	-0.271 (-13.1)	0.001 (0.0)
Religion: NA	-0.082 (-2.5)	-0.055 (-1.6)	-0.251 (-7.3)	-0.033 (-0.8)
Belongs to Majority Religion			-0.279 (-21.9)	-0.032 (-1.5)
Country Dummies	No	No	No	Yes
Obs.	60693	60693	60693	60693
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.003	0.008	0.012	0.056

a) z-statistics in parenthesis.

Religion can exert a more complex impact when investigating cross-terms. Some religion might foster more situation specific attitudes, suggesting that acceptable is whatever one is doing. To the contrary, other religions might be more principle oriented, suggesting that whatever one does, acceptability is a divine category that supersedes ones own actions and sentiments. Indeed, we do observe such differences. I highlight the findings for the two most extreme religions, Catholicism and Buddhism, as shown in figure 6.

Bribing Catholics have only a slightly higher tendency to accept as compared to non-bribing Catholics. There is a large share of Catholics who pay bribes while regarding this to be unacceptable. Despite the low acceptance of bribery in Venezuela, for example, 28% of respondents confessed to having paid a bribe, the 8<sup>th</sup> highest value in the survey. One is tempted to regard the ease of obtaining religious pardon as a reason for this finding.

To the contrary, Buddhist bribers have a higher level of acceptance as compared to Buddhist non-bribers. Their judgment is more situation specific, dependent on their own action. This suggests that cognitive dissonance is strongly felt among Buddhists but little among Catholics. We should note, however, that these findings do not survive controlling for country dummies. Thus, they are religious contributions to the characteristics of countries, but not of individuals.



While we did not introduce hypotheses related to gender, it makes sense to recognize such an impact. Table 4 reveals that men are more accepting than women. This is in line with related cross-country evidence, where more women in parliament and the labor force are found to lower levels of perceived corruption, (Swamy et al. 2001). Also experimental evidence reveals that women are less willing to take bribes (Schulze and Frank 2003) and less willing to reciprocate a bribe, (Frank et al. 2010). However, the results here emerge only because women more often responded “don’t know” to the vignettes and less often responded “yes” or “no”. This suggests that slight variations in how the dependent variable was determined had a noteworthy impact on this finding. Overall, issues of gender were thus less salient.

Another variable of interest is the level of education. As reported before, less educated respondents to the World Value Survey more often responded that accepting bribes is justified. This would be in line with hypothesis 7. But this finding would be biased if the less educated have a different understanding of the term “bribe”. In the data gathered here, respondents were supposed to report the highest level attained, picking “No education/ only basic education”; “Secondary school” or “High level education (e.g university)”.

Data on education was not gathered for Armenia, Belarus, Chile, Georgia and Kenya. I carry out separate regressions, without considering data on religion, so as to preserve the highest


sample possible. Regressions where data on religion is included were also carried out without producing noteworthy differences. We observe that respondents with basic education are less accepting, while those with higher education are more accepting. The last impact, however, is not robust to inclusion of further variables. The result for low education remains robust, allowing us to clearly reject hypothesis 6. Education does not bring about a stricter morality.

Table 5: Dependent Variable:  
Acceptability of bribes/gift-giving by Public Servant,  
Method: Maximum Likelihood Ordered Probit,  
Quadratic Hill Climbing.<sup>a)</sup>

Independent Variable	1.	2.	3.	4.
Paid Bribe		0.313 (-16.5)		0.163 (11.3)
Basic Education or less	-0.108 (-8.4)	-0.107 (-8.2)	-0.070 (-5.0)	-0.066 (-4.6)
High Level Education	0.027 (2.5)	0.020 (1.8)	0.018 (1.5)	0.013 (1.1)
Country Dummies	No	No	Yes	Yes
Obs.	63658	63158	63658	63158
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.003	0.053	0.054

a) z-statistics in parenthesis.

Testing cross-terms in table 5 reveals another insight into the impact of education on levels of acceptance. Rather than reporting these regressions, where the interpretation of cross-terms tends to be demanding, a more intuitive description can be obtained from figure 7. Those with a lower level of education judge more situation-specific. The lowly educated who paid a bribe reveal a high level of acceptance, while those who did not pay are less accepting. This difference is much more pronounced among those with a low level of education as compared to those with a medium and high level. Attitudes towards acceptability are overshadowed by ones own past action in particular among those with low levels of education. This result can be seen in light of Kohlberg’s link between education and moral reasoning. Higher stages of moral reasoning may allow abstracting from ones own past actions. This capacity is stronger among the better educated.



## 8 Conclusions

I designed vignettes on incidents of bribery and gift-giving, which were presented to more than 70,000 households in 66 countries. Responses allow for a comparison of behavior across countries and individual characteristics, not overshadowed by differences in definitions and terminology.

The results reveal that bribes are not globally condemned to an equal extent, as is suggested by the strong form of the universalistic doctrine. The level of acceptance does not only widely differ from one country to another. The survey results also allow us to trace the causes of different levels of acceptability. A higher acceptance of bribery can be observed in former colonies, countries where bribery is frequent and those without a majority religion. Those who paid bribes are more accepting. Hindus, Muslims, Other Christians and Buddhists report a higher acceptance of bribery. But their attitude does not differ to that of Catholics and others who live in the same country. Less educated respondents less accept bribery. Buddhists and less educated judge more situation-specific, accepting more often if they paid bribes themselves.

We can conclude that culture matters. But the observed impact is not in line with popular expectations. There is a widespread expectation that the stricter moral code can be found in rich, western countries, which are characterized by a high share of (Reform) Christians and higher levels of education. None of these hypotheses was supported. Low educated, non-Christian respondents from poor, non-western countries did not on average report higher levels of acceptability.

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## Appendix A

Country/ Territory	Survey Conducted by	Interview Mode	Sample Type	Size	Fieldwork Dates	Coordinated by Gallup Interna- tional (GI) or added by Trans- parency Interna- tional (TI)
Argentina	TNS Gallup Argentina	Face to face	National	1000	20 – 26 Nov	GI
Armenia	Georgian Opinion Research Business International (Gorbi)	Face to face	National	1000	25 Jan – 5 Feb	TI
Austria	Karmasin Institute	Face to face	National	751	10 – 30 Nov	GI
Azerbaijan	'PULS-R' Sociological Service	Face to face	National	1000	25 Jan – 3 Feb	TI
Belarus	Novak Center	Face to face	National	1044	23 Feb – 6 Mar	TI
Bolivia	Encuestas & Estudios	Face to face	Urban	1328	24 Nov – 10 Dec	GI
Bosnia & Herzegovina	Index Bosnia	Telephone	National	500	10 – 26 Nov	GI
Brunei Darussalam	Merdeka Center	Telephone	National	820	20 – 25 Feb	TI
Bulgaria	TNS Balkan British Social Surveys Gallup International	Face to face	National	1006	31 Oct – 7 Nov	GI
Cambodia	TNS Vietnam/Gallup International Association	Face to face	Main provinces	1019	12 – 24 Dec	TI
Cameroon	Research & Marketing Services Cameroon	Face to face	Main cities	519	29 Oct – 2 Nov	GI
Canada	Leger Marketing	Computer Assisted Web Interview	National	1450	28 Oct – 2 Nov	GI
Chile	IPSOS Chile	Face to face	Urban	1001	12 – 25 Feb	TI
Colombia	CNC	Telephone	Urban	600	31 Oct – 12 Nov	GI
Croatia	PULS	Face to face	National	1000	1 – 20 Nov	GI
Czech Republic	Mareco	Face to face	National	1000	7 – 17 Nov	GI
Denmark	TNS - Gallup	Computer Assisted Web Interview	National	1002	20 – 28 Nov	GI
El Salvador	Gallup International Affiliate	Face to face	Urban	500	10 – 14 Mar	TI
Finland	TNS Gallup OY	Panel online	National	1237	21 – 27 Nov	GI



FYR Macedonia	Brima	Face to face	National	1139	10 – 16 Nov	TI
Georgia	Georgian Opinion Research Business International (Gorbi)	Face to face	National	1400	29 Jan– 9 Feb	TI
Ghana	Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII)	Face to face	National	1190	23 – 28 Feb	GI
Greece	TNS ICAP	Telephone	National	500	17 Nov – 3 Dec	GI
Hong Kong	TNS Hong Kong	Online via Access Panels	National	1013	12 – 24 Nov	GI
Hungary	TARKI, Hungary	Face to face	National	1060	10 – 19 Jan	TI
Iceland	Capacent Gallup	Online Survey	National	1116	25 Nov – 1 Dec	GI
Israel	Gallup International Affiliate	Telephone	National	500	22 – 23 Feb	TI
India	TNS India	Face to face	National	1063	24 Oct – 26 Nov	GI
Indonesia	TNS Indonesia	Face to face	Urban	500	11 – 20 Nov	GI
Iraq	AICSS	Face to face	Urban	800	29 Oct – 5 Nov	TI
Japan	NRC	Face to face/Self-administered	National	1200	5 – 17 Nov	GI
Kenya	Steadman Group	Face to face	National	2007	20 – 23 Dec	TI
Kosovo (UN administration)	BBSS Gallup International	Face to face	Urban Albanian population	1012	14 – 20 Nov	GI
Kuwait	Pan Arab Research Center	Face to face	National	801	6 – 30 Nov	TI
Lebanon	Pan Arab Research Center	Face to face	National	1200	22 Oct– 12 Nov	TI
Lithuania	Vilmorus	Face to face	National	1003	4 – 7 Dec	TI
Luxembourg	TNS ILRES	Online Survey	National	504	3 – 7 Nov	GI
Malaysia	Merdeka Center	Telephone	National	1236	13 – 18 Feb	GI
Moldova	Centre of Sociological Investigations and marketing 'CBS AXA'	Face to face	National	1086	November	GI
Mongolia	IACC, Mongolia	Face to face	National	1020	16 – 20 Feb	TI
Morocco	TNS	Face to face	Urban	500	26 Nov – 12 Dec	TI
Netherlands	TNS NIPO	Online Survey	National	1202	5 – 10 Nov	GI
Nigeria	RMS Nigeria	Face to face	National	5007	12 – 22 Dec	GI
Norway	TNS Gallup	Web interview	National	1001	21 – 27 Nov	GI
Pakistan	Gallup Pakistan	Face to face	National	2027	26 Oct – 10 Nov	GI

Panama	PSM Sigma Dos Panama	Telephone	Main Cities	502	6 – 22 Nov	GI
Peru	Datum Internacional	Face to face	National	1078	4 – 8 Dec	GI
Philippines	Asia Research Organization	Face to face	National	1000	3 – 23 Nov	GI
Poland	Mareco Polska	Face to face	Urban	1026	25 – 30 Oct	GI
Portugal	TNS Euroteste	Telephone	Urban	507	20 Nov – 6 Jan	GI
Romania	CSOP	Face to face	National	1149	17 – 23 Nov	GI
Russia	Romir	Online	National	1500	19 – 26 Nov	GI
Serbia	TNS Medium Gallup Belgrade	Face to face	National	1015	21 – 27 Nov	GI
Senegal	Laboratoire de Recherches et d'Etudes sur la bonne Gouvernance	Face to face	National	1480	9 – 16 Feb	GI
Singapore	TNS Hong Kong	Online via Access Panels	National	1015	12 – 24 Nov	GI
South Korea	Gallup Korea	Face to face	National	700	7 – 25 Nov	GI
Spain	Sigmas Dos (Spain)	Telephone	National	602	17 Nov – 29 Dec	GI
Switzerland	Isopublic	Face to face	National	1005	19 Nov – 3 Dec	GI
Thailand	TNS Thailand	Telephone	National	500	17 – 28 Nov	GI
Turkey	TNS PIAR	Face to face	National	2000	1 Nov – 12 Dec	GI
Uganda	The Steadman Group Uganda	Face to face	National	1000	N/A	TI
Ukraine	TNS Ukraine	Face to face	National	1200	4 – 12 Nov	GI
United Kingdom	TNS	Online	National	1018	27 Nov – 1 Dec	GI
United States	TNS (United States)	Online	National	1017	30 Oct – 4 Nov	GI
Venezuela	Sigma Dos Venezuela	Face to face	Main city	1030	7 – 25 Nov	GI
Zambia	The Steadman Group Uganda	Face to face	National	902	N/A	TI

## Appendix B

### Further variables

Variable	Explanation	Source
Civil Liberties	Civil liberties, finally, comprise the freedom of expression and belief, personal autonomy as well as human and economic rights. A government that limits economic rights and civil liberties tends to distort markets, inducing the search for illegal ways to circumvent regulation. This creates opportunities for corruption.	Freedom House, data for 2000
Western	Countries from Western Europe and North America: Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, UK, USA	
GDP per Head	Purchasing Power Adjusted Data for Gross Production per Head	World Development Indicators, 2007
Colony	Defined as control and occupation by a distant country for at least 10 years during the last 100 years. such that a declaration of independence involved a change in power. The following 27 countries were rated as colonies: ARM, AZE, BLR, BRN, CMR, GEO, GHA, IDN, IND, IRQ, ISR, KEN, KHM, KOS, KWT, LBN, LTU, MAR, MDA, MYS, NGA, PAK, PHL, SEN, SGP, UGA, ZMB.	CIA factbook

## Appendix C

### Country Averages

Abbreviations are V: Vignette, PS: Public Servant, SK: Shopkeeper,  
A: Accepted; R: Rejected

Country	UN code	V 1: PS		V 1: SK		V 2: PS		V 2: SK		V 3: PS		V 3: SK	
		A	R	A	R	A	R	A	R	A	R	A	R
Venezuela	VEN	0.02	0.98	0.00	1.00	0.13	0.86	0.01	0.98	0.04	0.96	0.07	0.93
Morocco	MAR	0.01	0.98	0.08	0.92	0.03	0.97	0.07	0.93	0.04	0.94	0.10	0.89
Peru	PER	0.03	0.94	0.06	0.90	0.11	0.82	0.14	0.80	0.13	0.80	0.17	0.78
Iceland	ISL	0.02	0.94	0.03	0.92	0.10	0.83	0.20	0.73	0.10	0.75	0.13	0.77
Portugal	PRT	0.03	0.96	0.07	0.91	0.26	0.71	0.24	0.72	0.06	0.91	0.09	0.88
Spain	ESP	0.02	0.96	0.05	0.93	0.18	0.81	0.18	0.79	0.14	0.83	0.18	0.79
Turkey	TUR	0.03	0.84	0.10	0.78	0.05	0.83	0.11	0.76	0.05	0.81	0.11	0.73
Kosovo	KOS	0.07	0.82	0.09	0.79	0.07	0.78	0.08	0.77	0.07	0.77	0.09	0.76
Denmark	DNK	0.05	0.90	0.06	0.87	0.09	0.83	0.18	0.73	0.11	0.75	0.14	0.73
Brunei	BRN	0.02	0.97	0.04	0.95	0.12	0.83	0.15	0.80	0.22	0.72	0.24	0.69
Argentina	ARG	0.04	0.92	0.06	0.90	0.15	0.79	0.17	0.77	0.16	0.75	0.19	0.73
Chile	CHL	0.04	0.88	0.05	0.87	0.17	0.74	0.18	0.74	0.12	0.79	0.16	0.75
Macedonia	MKD	0.07	0.84	0.09	0.82	0.12	0.79	0.12	0.78	0.15	0.73	0.14	0.74
Norway	NOR	0.03	0.92	0.07	0.86	0.10	0.84	0.16	0.73	0.13	0.67	0.17	0.67
Bulgaria	BGR	0.03	0.89	0.11	0.77	0.05	0.84	0.10	0.76	0.11	0.72	0.19	0.63
Azerbaijan	AZE	0.00	1.00	0.06	0.94	0.10	0.90	0.10	0.89	0.32	0.65	0.35	0.63
Malaysia	MYS	0.03	0.95	0.09	0.88	0.12	0.82	0.18	0.75	0.20	0.74	0.23	0.70
Croatia	HRV	0.07	0.88	0.09	0.85	0.10	0.82	0.13	0.78	0.20	0.70	0.21	0.69
Georgia	GEO	0.02	0.86	0.08	0.80	0.10	0.76	0.16	0.69	0.12	0.71	0.16	0.67
Senegal	SEN	0.03	0.96	0.09	0.90	0.05	0.94	0.15	0.84	0.25	0.70	0.40	0.57
Canada	CAN	0.01	0.94	0.06	0.88	0.11	0.84	0.21	0.72	0.19	0.66	0.25	0.65
Finland	FIN	0.02	0.94	0.06	0.88	0.09	0.84	0.17	0.76	0.20	0.64	0.30	0.58
Lithuania	LTU	0.01	0.91	0.11	0.76	0.05	0.86	0.10	0.74	0.17	0.65	0.26	0.55
Hong Kong	HKG	0.05	0.90	0.07	0.87	0.13	0.80	0.18	0.74	0.19	0.68	0.26	0.63
Zambia	ZMB	0.04	0.95	0.09	0.90	0.20	0.78	0.22	0.76	0.26	0.71	0.28	0.69
Romania	ROM	0.05	0.78	0.06	0.74	0.08	0.73	0.08	0.71	0.15	0.60	0.13	0.62
Hungary	HUN	0.04	0.95	0.14	0.84	0.07	0.91	0.23	0.74	0.25	0.70	0.34	0.61
Greece	GRC	0.06	0.92	0.15	0.81	0.14	0.84	0.22	0.75	0.22	0.74	0.29	0.67
Serbia	SRB	0.07	0.88	0.15	0.77	0.10	0.84	0.19	0.72	0.17	0.72	0.25	0.63
Philippines	PHL	0.06	0.93	0.11	0.89	0.16	0.84	0.21	0.79	0.26	0.73	0.38	0.62
Bolivia	BOL	0.12	0.84	0.12	0.84	0.26	0.70	0.23	0.73	0.20	0.76	0.18	0.78
Japan	JPN	0.01	0.77	0.08	0.69	0.08	0.68	0.11	0.63	0.07	0.62	0.13	0.57
Colombia	COL	0.09	0.90	0.14	0.85	0.27	0.71	0.28	0.70	0.21	0.78	0.26	0.73
Israel	ISR	0.05	0.93	0.20	0.77	0.22	0.75	0.32	0.64	0.17	0.78	0.29	0.67
Poland	POL	0.07	0.82	0.11	0.77	0.18	0.69	0.21	0.65	0.18	0.64	0.21	0.61
Netherlands	NLD	0.02	0.93	0.08	0.87	0.21	0.72	0.34	0.59	0.19	0.66	0.29	0.61
Luxembourg	LUX	0.02	0.95	0.10	0.86	0.17	0.77	0.28	0.65	0.26	0.65	0.37	0.56
Indonesia	IDN	0.09	0.90	0.14	0.84	0.18	0.80	0.24	0.73	0.33	0.65	0.34	0.61
Kenya	KEN	0.08	0.89	0.12	0.85	0.25	0.73	0.23	0.75	0.29	0.66	0.33	0.63
USA	USA	0.04	0.86	0.05	0.84	0.20	0.68	0.29	0.57	0.19	0.56	0.24	0.57
Armenia	ARM	0.05	0.95	0.15	0.85	0.16	0.84	0.26	0.74	0.31	0.67	0.47	0.51
El Salvador	SLV	0.03	0.78	0.11	0.72	0.06	0.75	0.27	0.52	0.14	0.63	0.28	0.50
Panama	PAN	0.18	0.81	0.21	0.78	0.29	0.70	0.31	0.68	0.25	0.74	0.26	0.73
Cameroon	CMR	0.08	0.91	0.21	0.78	0.16	0.83	0.26	0.72	0.32	0.66	0.41	0.57

South Korea	KOR	0.07	0.91	0.23	0.74	0.13	0.83	0.29	0.66	0.28	0.67	0.39	0.56
Austria	AUT	0.03	0.96	0.13	0.84	0.26	0.71	0.33	0.64	0.32	0.64	0.37	0.59
Ukraine	UKR	0.11	0.72	0.21	0.59	0.11	0.72	0.24	0.55	0.10	0.65	0.22	0.53
Ghana	GHA	0.08	0.91	0.13	0.86	0.12	0.85	0.21	0.76	0.46	0.51	0.48	0.49
Thailand	THA	0.11	0.87	0.21	0.76	0.17	0.81	0.28	0.70	0.34	0.63	0.42	0.54
Bosnia & Herzegovina	BIH	0.04	0.70	0.09	0.63	0.10	0.50	0.10	0.53	0.08	0.38	0.08	0.39
Singapore	SGP	0.05	0.88	0.11	0.80	0.26	0.64	0.36	0.53	0.24	0.56	0.33	0.51
Belarus	BLR	0.07	0.79	0.26	0.57	0.14	0.72	0.29	0.54	0.17	0.66	0.32	0.51
Czech Republic	CZE	0.09	0.83	0.17	0.73	0.18	0.70	0.28	0.59	0.27	0.56	0.37	0.47
UK	GBR	0.08	0.56	0.14	0.50	0.17	0.66	0.26	0.53	0.15	0.61	0.22	0.58
Switzerland	CHE	0.09	0.81	0.13	0.77	0.24	0.64	0.32	0.57	0.29	0.56	0.34	0.53
Kuwait	KWT	0.17	0.74	0.11	0.82	0.40	0.52	0.17	0.73	0.29	0.58	0.40	0.49
Iraq	IRQ	0.15	0.74	0.21	0.67	0.22	0.66	0.22	0.65	0.33	0.52	0.36	0.50
India	IND	0.25	0.71	0.29	0.68	0.23	0.73	0.28	0.69	0.36	0.60	0.37	0.59
Uganda	UGA	0.12	0.86	0.26	0.73	0.22	0.76	0.27	0.71	0.49	0.49	0.52	0.46
Lebanon	LBN	0.08	0.91	0.21	0.78	0.29	0.70	0.44	0.55	0.43	0.56	0.48	0.51
Mongolia	MNG	0.11	0.71	0.28	0.51	0.20	0.56	0.39	0.39	0.19	0.56	0.33	0.43
Nigeria	NGA	0.20	0.70	0.22	0.68	0.28	0.61	0.29	0.60	0.41	0.47	0.42	0.46
Moldova	MDA	0.21	0.59	0.23	0.54	0.23	0.53	0.23	0.53	0.31	0.43	0.35	0.40
Russia	RUS	0.16	0.76	0.29	0.60	0.28	0.66	0.38	0.53	0.41	0.46	0.56	0.34
Pakistan	PAK	0.18	0.60	0.31	0.48	0.32	0.44	0.34	0.43	0.35	0.40	0.41	0.35
Cambodia	KHM	0.06	0.94	0.34	0.66	0.44	0.56	0.56	0.44	0.72	0.28	0.77	0.23

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